$322 million for contra aid. About $142 million was for military purposes and $179 million for nonmilitary purposes.3 As Table 1 
Private Donors
From June 1985 through March 1986, private donors provided another $10 million.'2 Only $4.5 million was spent on the contras, however. And only about $2.7 million of that actually reached the contras, since the remaining $1.8 million was paid for political advertising, lobbying, and other activities on the contras' behalf in the United States. 13 In sum, third countries and private parties provided about $54 ($32, $2, $10, $10) million, of which the contras received about $36.5 ($32, $4.5) million.
Arms Sales Diversions
How much money did the diversion of profits (residuals) from U.S. arms sales to Iran during late 1985 to late 1986 produce for the contras, and how much of that did the contras receive? In the 25 November 1986 announcement of the diversions, former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese estimated that the residuals may have produced $10 to $30 million for the contras, but subsequent estimates were lower.'4 In early 1987, the report of the Tower Commission, a group set up by President Ronald Reagan to investigate the National Security Council process and the Iran-contra scandal, suggested that the arms sales produced about $19.8 million for potential diversion. ' vember 1985 for the eighteen HAWKs (S3),28 there was no completed sale to produce any profit, because the Iranians returned seventeen of the missiles as unsatisfactory after test-firing one. However, because Israel advanced $1 million, of which only about $150,000 was spent on the abortive sale, and the rest was not returned, the third transaction produced $850,000, some of which was used for the contras.29
The last three shipments (S4-S6), all in 1986, involved planned diversions. Table  2 provides a summary of the sales and funds involved.
In short, the six shipments of arms to Iran produced as much as $25 million, at least $16. 1 million of which could potentially be diverted for the contras. When the Iran arms sales operation was exposed and stopped in late 1986, however, less than a quarter of the $16. 1 million in residuals had been spent on the contras:35 according to the congressional report, the contras only received about 4 In July 1986, following the exhaustion of the $27 million for FY85 spring, the contras supposedly went $2.5 million in debt (Tower, 7he Tower Commission Report, 341). During that period from July until October 1986, when $60 million of the $100 million was disbursed, the contras received only part of $2.7 million in private donations and $3.8 million in arms sales diversions, and no third country donations. 49 The diversions, however, did not follow proper procedures. They were apparently not approved by the president, since he claimed not to have known about them.73 The November 1985 arms sales (but not the diversions of profits) were retroactively approved by presidential finding in December 1985, and the 1986 sales were prospectively approved by a January 1986 finding.74 Since, however, the president approved only the arms sales and not the diversions, the minority claim of constitutional protection is moot.75 In short, the diversions were illegal under Boland II even in the minority logic.
ARms SALES PROFITS AND THIRD-PARTY DONATIONS DURING PERIODS
Under the majority logic, the Boland II ban prohibited any solicitation by government officials and the use of arms profits diverted under NSC guidance In sum, third-party contributions and arms sales diversions did occur during the Boland II ban and sustained the contras when they had no U.S. funds.77 Third-country funding provided a significant amount of military aid ($34 million) for the contras. Private donations ($2.7 million) and diverted arms sales profits ($3.8 million) provided little ($6.5 million) for military supplies. Though the third-country donations to the contras started before the Boland restrictions began, the ban did prohibit the solicitation of most private donations, military contributions by third countries, and diversions of arms sales profits because U.S. government personnel were involved in the requests or implementation.
POLICY QUESTIONS
To this point, the analysis has clarified the details of contra funding and the Boland bans in order to provide a basis on which to evaluate the policy itself. The rest of the article explores the debate about U.S. policy on funding the contras and suggests provisional answers. Did funding the contras, both by congressionally appropriated U.S. aid and outside funds, advance U.S. interests? Were the administration's attempts to find extragovernmental or extralegal monies when U.S. government funds were not available worth the efforts? In short, were the benefits of the policy of supporting the contras worth the costs?
The answers to these questions depend, in large part, on whether or not one agrees with the Reagan administration's approach to dealing with Nicaragua. While both the Reagan policy and the pattern of U.S. interventions have been widely questioned,78 this analysis begins by examining Reagan policies on their own terms as administration attempts to achieve its goals. It then compares the administration approval to potential alternatives. It also looks at some of the wider implications for democratic governance of the administration's approach. The contras were a proxy force under the Reagan Doctrine of helping others fight anticommunist battles that also served U. S. government interests. 83 Fighting wars through proxies is an ancient part of great power struggles and often substitutes for open warfare between superpowers. In general, a democracy should fight its wars with its own soldiers, but using surrogates may be less dangerous than risking superpower confrontations.
While a superpower democracy does not always fight its own battles, it needs to take direct responsibility for funding those fights. The privatization of both foreign policy funding and wars"' runs contrary to fundamental principles of democratic governance and sovereignty, particularly the rule of law and the power of the purse. Extragovemmental funding, even if not illegal, corrodes democratic legitimacy. The executive cannot decide to fmance wars without congressional approval. Moreover, the powers the U.S. Constitution vests in the Congress to decide to fight wars, and the responsibility to carry out the conflict through the armed forces directed by the president, cannot be in executive hands only,85 because the separation of powers must provide a check on potentially irresponsible actions. In order to sustain the validity of the democratic safeguards, the Congress must be able to end the fighting by cutting off the funding, and the executive must be faithfully bound by such restrictions. The use of private funds for public purposes and, particularly, the privatization of foreign policy funding distort the structure of authorization and appropriation in a democracy.
Moreover, a country should not fight voluntary wars for which it cannot pay. Having others pay for and fight a nation's battles, even through surrogates, distorts basic principles of democratic accountability, which requires a nation to decide to take upon itself the required sacrifice and bear the burden as a nation. Even if most of the outside funding were legal, as the administration and the minority report propose, such mechanisms of support and implementation stray beyond democratic accountability, because they take actions that the people and their elected representatives do not directly support.86 By soliciting others for funds, the administration was potentially undermining its own prerogatives in the policy-making process.
Furthermore, legal or not, the propriety of government officials soliciting third party or private funds is questionable and fundamentally inappropriate. The 
